Abstract: This article argues that education in Africa, from colonial times to the postcolony, has been the victim of various forms of violence, the most devastating of which is the violence of cultural and political conversion: externally and internally driven initiatives and processes intended to domesticate, harness, transform, alter, remodel, adapt, or reconstruct Africa and Africans through schools and universities to suit new ways of being, seeing, doing, and thinking. As a result of such violence, educational systems have privileged mimicry and transformed epistemologies informed by partial theories to metanarratives of arrogance, superiority, and intolerance of creative differences. Even when clear alternatives are imagined to the current irrelevance in education, economic difficulties render their realization extremely difficult. Repressive states have perpetuated and capitalized upon this predicament by manipulating desperate academics into compliance and complicity with mediocrity. This article examines some epistemological consequences of such alienation and irrelevance and looks at their implications for theorizing Africa. It calls for a global conversation of universities and scholars in which Africa participates on its own terms, with the interests and concerns of ordinary Africans as its guiding principle.
nomic dependence of all kinds on the other. But as analytically useful as such a distinction may be, the reality of many a university and intellectual in Africa is often one of juggling or straddling both worlds (see Copans 1993; Toulabor 1993:5-6; CODESRIA 1996 CODESRIA :3-5, 1997 Mkandawire 1997) . While conscious of the relationship of unequal exchange that these constraints could occasion between African universities and more endowed and more autonomous universities elsewhere, the emphasis in most essays in this volume is on how the postcolonial state in Africa has sought to skew the balance in its favor, especially when the modes of access to power and knowledge have increasingly been contested by other forces in society. In this connection, it is of particular importance to understand the dynamics of African universities by examining the extent to which various states have sought to control universities and intellectual production through physical and symbolic violence, and to understand the form that violence takes (e.g., censorship, the political commodification of knowledge translatable into privilege and office, and the celebration of mediocrity at the expense of meritocracy and collegial democracy). It is of interest to what extent survival politics have triumphed over meaningful democratization, creating in the process a type of intellectual who seems more preoccupied by politics of upward mobility than with theoretical endeavors and the pursuit of science and knowledge. In other words, how have diminishing resources for universities and the loss in value of academic qualifications engendered or exacerbated opportunism, corruption, mediocrity, politicization, the use and misuse of students in academic circles? How do academics, who have for one reason or another abandoned their vanguard role in favour of vested political interests, justify their options? The essays in this volume touch on some or all of these issues, discussing the implications with examples drawn from different countries and regions of Africa. Clearly, a volume like this cannot exhaust the rich variety of issues pertaining to universities and intellectual life in Africa; but we have achieved our purpose if this modest effort inspires fellow scholars to devote research attention and funds to this very important area.
Although universities can in themselves be highly hierarchical, bureaucratic, and paradoxically most intolerant at times, they are still expected to play the conventional role of serving as liminal spaces that privilege dialogical reciprocity. As such, they should be, par excellence, sites for the practice of democracy, both as an individual and a group right. However, given their very seductiveness to reactionary and revolutionary forces alike, intellectuals and universities have the potential to wield the double-edged sword. It is therefore not surprising that in Africa both the state and civil society have tended to appropriate universities in the quest for justifications of their competing versions of societal projects. And African scholars have, quite predictably, produced competing, if not conflicting, agendas or visions for state legitimation or demystification (see Copan 1990 Copan :305-59, 1993 Eboussi Boulaga 1993:30-34; Toulabor 1993; Kom 1996; Tedga 1998; Ngowet 2001:127-38; Mamdani 1990 Mamdani , 1993 and Amuwo, Jua & Nyamnjoh, Kerr & Mapanje, this volume) . Various strategies have been used by the state, on the one hand, to police the production of subversive literature, and by some contending forces, on the other (e.g., opposition parties, critical media, NGOs, churches, trade unions, student organizations, etc.), to enable that very production. The role African universities have actually played in various struggles, including the current democratization process, could serve as a barometer for state commitment to institutional change, on the one hand, and resistance to state repression or manipulation on the other. If the premium is on containment rather than on facilitation and empowerment, then criteria for appointment to and retainment in universities of lecturers and administrators would be loyalty rather than meritocracy, gate-keeping rather than enlightenment, with license to use and abuse students as the reward. Modes of selection or access to power, it could be argued, have an impact upon, or indeed determine, modes of perception and commitment to promoting scholarship. To this end, operational principles used in African universities as microcosms of society are revealing. Thus, if bias is introduced into the employment process to ensure the recruitment of ideologues and an emphasis placed on a subjecting pedagogy, then it is improbable that such a university could become fertile ground for a democratic and democratizing culture. But it certainly would be a ground for serious conflicts, latent or overt, as the dominant ideology seeks to reproduce itself through mediocrity and the blunting of the intellect. University education finds itself in crisis, as vacillation and dissembling over reform become the order of the day and protecting vested interests the overriding concern. The holder of the Ph.D. is guilty of the "pull him down" syndrome in relation to fellow academics and students. Miserable salaries and material hardship have contributed to the university's becoming part of the postcolonial "phallocracy," where "pride in possessing an active penis has to be dramatized" by male academics seeking "the unconditional subordination of women to the principle of male pleasure." In some cases, female students are made to understand that the "heat of [their] thighs" or the "miraculous properties of their cowl" can deliver certificates faster than their intellects can (Mbembe 1992:9-24; 2001:127) . Hence the celebration of violence against female students and the prevalence of "Sexually Transmitted Marks" with or without mitigation by fear of HIV/AIDS. 2 Intellectuals and universities, the knowledge they produce, and the services they provide to processes of democratization or their obfuscation are shaped as well by non-state local institutions, the international context, economic downturns, and concomitant structural adjustment programs (see Anugwom, Kerr & Mapanje, this volume) . The relationship of intellectuals and university personnel to the state and its programs must be understood in relation to other sponsors of intellectual production and other venues for the propagation of knowledge, many of which also sit ambivalently between civil society and the state. Academics in Africa work not only within local discourses but also in relation to transnational disciplinary debates, often facilitated by connections and communication with fellow academics in diasporic spaces, nowadays quite often via electronic bulletin boards. How do African scholars mediate the international discourses of their disciplines with the intellectual and political demands of local contexts under situations of ever diminishing funds and prospects? Academics and other intellectuals are also often engaged by NGOs, whose programs are either interlinked with the silencing needs of the autocratic state or with worldwide "universalist humanitarian" discourses whose terms may reproduce mediocrity and banality and stifle the development of an indigenous African intellectual renaissance. Intellectuals may be drawn to the various media-literary, reporting and commenting, other research centers, film, public lectures-as an alternative venue to the universities and state institutions, but the role of these media themselves as genuine participants in a democratizing civil society or as complicit in processes of silencing, delimiting legitimate knowledge, and underwriting state extractions must be scrutinized carefully. This special volume of the African Studies Review can be seen as a starting point in a journey of a thousand miles that should culminate, eventually, in a Kilimanjaro of excellence in research on higher education in Africa.
Violence in the African university, the political commodification of knowledge, the uncertain role of the scholar-academic in the local sociopolitical set-up must all be examined closely in terms of parallel contradictions at the global level. Programs of structural adjustment and the unequal flows of labor, capital, and knowledge are reproduced within the African academy-significantly mediated by the often self-serving and extractive programs of African states. Global economics, transnational disciplinary discourses, national welfare, state political programs, the local university, and local social affiliations set up competing horizons within which intellectuals must establish orientations and affinities, often with a significant measure of ambivalence (see Amuwo, Anugwom, Kerr & Mapanje, this volume) . While some African intellectuals may be compelled (for various reasons, including the quest for job satisfaction, economic hardship, political repression, and intra-university conflicts and tensionssee Onyejekwe 1993; Rwomire 1993; Kom 1993; 1996:269-77; Oucho 2000; Campbell 2001 ) to pursue careers elsewhere, for those who remain within Africa, the question is one of how intellectual orientations are formed, how different interests are recognized and articulated, and what limitations are placed on the pursuit of these interests.
Increasingly, though, advances in information and communications technologies have not only accelerated the migration of skills and labor away from African universities, but also have made it possible for the brain drain to be converted to brain gain by mobilizing diaspora intellectual capital for purposes of liberation and local development initiatives through partnerships with home-based universities and intellectuals (see ChukwuEmeka Chikezie Fergusson 2000) . Thus, even though the estimated three hundred thousand or more African professionals and experts working in the West may not return permanendy to a continent plagued by conflicts, poverty, and reluctant democracies, with good policies, their talents and achievements could always be appropriated in one way or another. But it remains to be established whether current policies by African governments of detection, detention, and deportation of fellow Africans whose skills are found to be redundant in their individual home countries (Africa Insight 2000 [2] ; Akokpari 1999 Akokpari , 2000 Akokpari , 2001 , could ever appeal to the sense of solidarity and generosity of successful diasporic Africans, some of whom are pan-Africanist in sympathies.
Contradictory expectations about the role of the African academicfor example, in promoting a culture of autocracy or democracy-should inspire him or her to contribute to the cutting edge of scholarship in this area. Surprisingly, however, African scholars have produced only a few narratives, which, though only passing references in the literature, point to a rich body of knowledge out there yearning to be harnessed. This volume cannot begin to do justice to this need, yet only by documenting such rich experience will African scholars contribute to the cultural revival of the continent, even if the contribution takes the form of a future in the rearview mirror. Which factors account for the failure of this prise de conscience} Could it be the fact that higher education as a valid field of study and research in the social sciences has yet to make its mark in Africa? To what extent does the colonial origin of Africa's educational systems hold the key to understanding the present and shaping the future of higher education?
Beginning the process of answering these questions and others is precisely what we seek to achieve in this special issue of the African Studies Review, "African Universities in Crisis and the Promotion of a Democratic Culture: The Political Economy of Violence in African Universities." The various contributions are from (1) scholars teaching and doing research in African universities who can comment reflectively on, and provide informed analysis of, the crisis and violence in African universities and the role of universities in the democratization process; and (2) scholars and or researchers working specifically in the field of study of higher education or universities in Africa who have investigated developments and happenings in this area with methodological rigor and social scientific insight. These articles discuss a variety of themes: the legacies of colonial higher education policies; African universities and the state; African universities, market forces, and the commodification of knowledge; African universities and new technologies; repressive dynamics within student cultures; and the class tension in African universities between knowledge elites and the rest of the national population, among others. In a reaction piece, Dominic Boyer summarizees and discusses these issues in detail, situating the African concerns in a wider global perspective. Below we provide a frame-work for understanding the various essays by focusing on the colonial origins of and impact on Africa's university crises, and stressing the necessary epistemological breaks that could render the system more relevant to the needs of ordinary Africans.
Violence of Cultural Conversion in Africa
University education in Africa and for Africans is like a pilgrimage to the Kilimanjaro of Western intellectual ideals, but also the tortuous way to Calvary for alternative ways of life (see Okot p'Bitek 1989; Ngugi wa Thiong'o 1986; Mazrui 1986 Mazrui , 2001 Mamdani 1990 Mamdani , 1993 Copans 1990; Rwomire 1992; van Rinsum 2001) . The value of university education in Africa is best understood in comparison with the soft currencies of the continent. Just as even the most stable currencies are used to taking nose-dives in relation to the hard currencies of the West over die years, so has the value of university education diminished in the continent. And just as African presidents prefer to beg and bank in foreign currencies-ignoring even banknotes that bear their own faces and stamp of omnipotence-so do they prefer the Western intellectual and expert over locally produced expertise. The practice, since independence, has been to model university education in Africa after universities in the West, with each country drawing from the institutions of the immediate past colonial master, or from the U.S. (Crossman & Devisch 1999:20-23; Mazrui 2001:39-45) .
The elite have, "often in unabashed imitativeness" and with little attempt at domestication, sought to reproduce (even without the finances to sustain them) the Oxfords, Cambridges, Harvards, Stanfords, and Sorbonnes of England, the U.S., and France (see Mazrui 2001:39-38) . Some, like the late Presidents Banda of Malawi and Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d'lvoire, have sometimes carried this craving to ridiculous proportions, seeking to be identified exclusively as Europhiles in education and consumption. Education in Africa has been and mostly remains a journey fueled by an exogenously induced and internalized sense of inadequacy in Africans, and endowed with the mission of devaluation or annihilation of African creativity, agency, and value systems. Such "cultural estrangement" has served to reinforce in Africans self-devaluation and self-hatred and a profound sense of inferiority that in turn compels them to "lighten their darkness," both physically and metaphorically, for Western gratification (Fanon 1967:169) . Nyang has captured this predicament as "a pathological case of xenophilia," whereby Africans are brought to value things Western "not for their efficacy but simply because of their foreignness" (1994:434), thereby consuming to death their creativity and dignity, their very own humanity (see Soyinka 1994b) .
This process of culturally uprooting the African has been achieved often through literally uprooting children of the well-off from their com-munities and nurturing them in boarding schools, "almost like potted plants in green houses" (Mamdani 1990:3) . "The European Other haunts the African Self from a young age in a post-colonial school" (Mazrui 2001:41) . Examples abound of African countries where a foreign visitor in the heart of the "African jungle" suddenly finds him-or herself surrounded by a group of Latin-speaking lads and lasses, who are ready to challenge his or her "Westernness" with classical knowledge of Aristotle, Caesar, Plato, Shakespeare, and other symbols of Western intellectual and cultural traditions. These mini Etons (Sorbonnes, Oxfords, Cambridges, Harvards, Stanfords) in the bush are set up by Europhiles who spend a sizeable portion of the enfeebled national budgets on tutors who are imported from the West and paid European rates to instruct the children of the well-off on how to excel in the irrelevant.
In the long run, neither the children of the lowly and poor, who in effect cannot afford the same chance to excel in this type of xenophilia, nor the children of the well-off schooled in such appetites, are in a position to contribute toward solving Africa's pressing problems in a way meaningful to the bulk of the population: the latter having spent all their time learning to do what they don't need, and the former having been relegated to pose as custodians of dying traditions which the elite shun, and which at best are thought of only as a means of "base" entertainment by the urban-centerd elite and their foreign guests and tourists. If and when there is any attempt at indigenization or endogenization, this is hardly pushed beyond the point where students are force-fed by state-appointed pro-establishment professors and administrators with doctored versions of culture and history celebrating the heroic feats of so-called Founding Fathers or the dominant groupings of their "nation-states." From independence to date, "African universities have been successful in Africanizing their personnel but not their curricula or pedagogical structures to any real extent" (Crossman & Devisch 1999:11) . The assumption has been that because one is African one is necessarily going to be critical of Western intellectual traditions and rituals in one's teaching and research and will offer a menu more sensitive to local realities than what is served in Western academic restaurants. But this is far from the case, as even the 150 universities created after independence have stayed "triumphantly universalistic and uncompromisingly foreign" to local cultures, populations, and predicaments (Mamdani 1993:11-15) . The reality is a double alienation, first by illadapted academic traditions internalized through an education of extraversion, and second by repressive state structures.
A good case in point of excellence at irrelevance in education is provided by the late Kamuzu Banda's Malawi. In a BBC television documentary broadcast on September 8, 1987, Malawi was singled out as an example of a country that had established a school that resembled Eton of England. The school, Kamuzu Academy, was situated in the Kasungu District in the Central Region of Malawi, President Banda's home area. Nicknamed by some critics the "Eton of the Bush," it was built in 1981 and imported all its educational equipment from the U.K. and South Africa. When the school was short of chemicals or other equipment, those concerned had to drive for at least five hundred miles to acquire new ones. The school cost not less than UK£15 million to build, and needed not less than UK£1 million a year to run. (Incidentally, Houphouet-Boigny did more than build les grandes ecoles along French lines. Animated by the same logic, his Basilica of Our Lady of Peace in his native Yamoussoukro cost no less than UK£100 million to construct and needs about UK£1.5 million a year to maintain, and what is more, a team of Polish priests assigned by the Vatican to run.)
The students of Kamuzu Academy, whose table manners would put many a working-class Briton to shame, were made to believe that no one is truly educated unless he or she knows something about the ancient world, which should not be mistaken to mean the ancestral world of the African (pregnant with primitive savagery and to be treated with disdain), but the world of Julius Caesar, Aristotle, Plato, Socrates, and other founding fathers of Western intellectual traditions. If ancestors are supposed to lay the path for posterity, inviting Africans to forget their ancestors was an invitation for them to be born again and socialized afresh in the image of the West, using Western-type academic institutions and rituals. This renewal in tune with Western values and institutions was achieved by "promoting beliefs and values congenial t o . . . [the West]; naturalizing and universalizing such beliefs so as to render them self-evident and apparently inevitable; denigrating ideas which might challenge it; excluding rival forms of thought, perhaps by some unspoken but systematic logic; and obscuring social reality in ways convenient to itself (Eagleton 1991:5-6, original emphasis) . Only through such strategies of legitimation could the West "wipe the blackboard clean" by turning its African students into slaves of Western definitions (see van Rinsum 2001 and this volume). As Eagleton argues, since nobody is ever "wholly mystified" or "a complete dupe," an ideology can succeed only if those it characterizes as inferior actually learn to be inferior. "It is not enough for a woman or colonial subject to be defined as a lower form of life. They must be actively taught this definition, and some of them prove to be brilliant graduates in this process" (Eagleton 1991:xv, original emphasis) .
All teachers in the Kamuzu Academy were white, recruited directly from Britain, and, of course, paid British rates at a time when few local teachers could make ends meet with their own salaries in soft local currencies. As Mazrui noted of the entire continent a year before the BBC documentary was broadcast, commitment and the sense of vocation were dwindling among teachers in Africa, who were "often underpaid and in some countries... not paid at all for months on end," and who were sometimes forced "to look for moonlighting opportunities to give them an additional livelihood." Support for universities was declining, and in certain countries, professors were forced "to look for additional jobs ranging from taxi-driving to farming" in order to make ends meet (Mazrui 1986:204) . Meanwhile, in Malawi, imported teachers on three-year contracts lived in European-style bungalows with salaries in hard currencies. Little has changed for the good, much for the worse. Almost everywhere the consultancy syndrome has triumphed over traditional academic values such as excellence in teaching, research, and publication. University professors who have failed to migrate are forced to postpone academic excellence to a later date. "They would rather not be wasting their time publishing and perishing," and even the most inspiring of them "are working under conditions that stymy their creativity and fail to challenge their students" (Onyejekwe 1993:3) .
English was the main language of instruction at the Kamuzu Academy. Not only was ChiChewa, the national language, not taught, students were even forbidden from speaking it in the academy. Writing about Kenya, Ngugi wa Thiong'o shows just how widespread this practice was. The postcolonial instructors who inherited condescending English attitudes to local languages continued "to ban African languages in schools and to elevate English as the medium of instruction from primary to secondary stages" and did not hesitate to mete out corporal punishment to and extort fines from students "caught speaking their mother tongues" (Ngugi wa Thiong'o 1997:620). Invited to address the OAU at Addis Ababa, Ali Mazrui insisted on doing so in Kishwahili, but there was neither translator nor switch button provided for Africa's most spoken language. 'You needed to see how the Heads of States were bewildered," he says, "but I had passed my message across" (Mazrui 1986 ). This practice gave status to the English language by associating it with civilization and enlightenment, and made African languages inferior in the eyes of the African students born into these languages. Unlike Somalia, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Kenya, and Botswana, many an African country has yet to demonstrate in principle and practice that literacy, even at primary school level, does not necessarily mean knowing how to read and write a Western language. Only a few African countries have bothered to adopt policies that encourage education in African languages, and even this limited number have tended to confine the importance of local languages to primary-and secondaryschool education, thereby accentuating the remoteness and irrelevance of universities to the bulk of the population. With perhaps the exception of Tanzania, there is hardly a single sub-Saharan African university that "offers a full diploma programme with an African language as principal medium of instruction" (see Crossman & Devisch 1999:7) .
At the Kamuzu Academy where the Etonians of the bush were trained to recite Shakespeare and glorify the classic philosophers of the West, the library that housed the classics was deliberately designed in the image of the U. S. Library of Congress. There was Western influence everywhere: an influence so successful that in a debate about whether or not Western influence corrupts, sixty-seven students "felt" that it did not, while only fifty-five students "felt" it did. Perhaps by the time they had imbibed an awful lot of Latin, classical music, Western history, literature and etiquette, and consumed enough McDonaldized entertainment television, very few of them "felt" anything clearly at all. As the presenter of the BBC documentary observed, the students knew more about Europe than they did of Malawi, so much so that occasionally the teachers went on field trips with the students "partly to bring their own country home to them." Parents, he went on, sacrificed so that their children could acquire values and an education that were alien to their cultures of origin.
This, of course, is hardly news to other Africans who have drunk from the well of "modern education" in similarly Western-styled institutions modeled on the colonial educational system with "its heavy literary and non-technical emphasis" (Mazrui 1986:233) . Many preindependence generations in former English colonies (Anglophones) would recall how as far back as the primary school, they were taught to sing "London's Burning" and "God Save the Queen" and learned from readers written and illustrated with English pupils in mind. This is still very much the case in some socalled prestigious English-medium schools, where African children from the tender age of kindergarten internalize from ill-adapted imported books that claim, for example: "Our country is America, and our founding president was George Washington." Africans of former French colonies (Francophones) recall being made to venerate "nos ancetres les Gaulois" and to pay religious attention to Tintin (a French cartoon character) and his worldwide adventures and to applaud his mission civilisatrice au Congo: Tintin, who in terms of spreading the French culture, was De Gaulle's only threat and rival; "Je n'ai qu'un seul concurrent: Tintin," De Gaulle once confessed.
At the end of their school years, the African students were (and still very much are, in some countries) treated to school-leaving examinations set and marked in Cambridge, London, or Paris by examiners filled with misrepresentations of the Africa these students know. Yet because the educational system emphasizes mimicry over creativity, the students often managed to scrape through by regurgitating what they had passively internalized. At secondary school students were taught as if history, geography, and literature were exclusively Western. For which reason they learnt to recite, for example, the rise and fall of the English Pitts, Walpoles, Disraelis, Gladstones, Palmerstones, Chamberlains, and Pretenders. They burned the midnight oil cramming all there was to cram about the extraordinary feats of many a great European leader, to the point that they could recite everything that had ever been written about Frederick the Great of Prussia, Catherine the Great of Russia, Joseph II and Maria Theresa, Metternich of Austria, Louis kRoi Soleil, and Napoleon the Warring Soldier of France, Bismarck the Iron Chancellor of Germany, Churchill the Witty Premier of War-Time Britain, and all the others. In geography, they knew more about shipbuilding (Tyne, Tees, Clyde) and the agrarian and industrial revolu-tions in England, more about the Rhine-Ruhr industrial complex in Germany, and more of French vineyards than about their own villages and history. And need we mention literature, which for long has meant glorifying and encouraging the consumption of Western art and creativity while actively devaluing the creative genius of Africa? If much has been done to indigenize and endogenize the teaching of history and geography in Africa, much remains to be done to make curricula for other social sciences more contextually relevant (see Crossman & Devisch 1999) .
It takes a journey to the West for one to know how much easier it is to acquire knowledge when that knowledge is based firmly on the past experiences, worldviews, and material conditions of one's own society and people. When one can read or hear in abstraction only, about places and peoples one has seldom seen or met, learning can becomes a tedious, mystifying, intimidating, alienating, and debasing process.
Economic Dimensions of Excellence at Irrelevance in Education
There are basically two ways of journeying to the West. One can undertake the journey physically, or one can do so psychologically by means of education and the media. Either way, one still succeeds in imbibing Western influences. Western-style training at Kamuzu Academy-type institutions is not just intended to compensate for the real West where these students have not yet been. It is seen as preparing them for Europe and North America, where they ultimately yearn to go to make use of the skills they have acquired. Thus, if at the Kamuzu Academy they were being taught all about Sunday barbecues, swimming pools, table etiquette, the classics, suits, ties, horse riding, and straw hats (or how to be the complete gentieman or lady a I'anglaise), this training was meant to purge them of that "Tarzanic jungleness" that has qualified Africa to be considered "the Dark Continent" and Africans as people desperately in need of salvation from a mission civilisatrice. It is hard to imagine African students who have gone through all these stages of Westernization returning home to bear with a stiff upper lip the misery and poverty of un-or underemployment. Brain drain has been an inevitable consequence. As Mamdani observes, in its craving for centers of learning and research of international standing, Africa has produced researchers and educators with "little capacity to work in surrounding communities but who could move to any institution in any industrialised country, and serve any privileged community around the globe with comparative ease." The failure by the university system in Africa to contextualize standards and excellence according to the needs and conditions of Africans has resulted in an intelligentsia with little stamina for the very process of development whose vanguard they claim to be (Mamdani 1993:15).
The BBC concluded its documentary with the presenter's saying that, while Eton of England grew naturally out of the English society as an answer to the felt needs of the English people, the Eton of Malawi was a transplant that could hardly be said to answer to the needs of Malawians. That certainly is the case, for millions of pounds were spent to "prepare" young Africans for Europe, where they almost always went for further studies, but little was spent to prepare them for Africa, where they were expected to return with their degrees and be of service to those whose expensive sacrifices had facilitated the luxury of their Western education.
While the BBC documentary focused on Malawi in this regard, the mad craving for Westernization and Western-style educational institutions is by no means confined to Malawi. It is a problem of which the African leadership as a whole is guilty (see Crossman & Devisch 1999) . The quest for Western academic symbols of credentialism-sometimes termed diplomania-and respect for qualifications obtained abroad have characterized postcolonial Africa. Africans are still very much dependent on ill-adapted curricula, sources and types of knowledge that alienate and enslave, all in the name of modernity. Sometimes it does not matter whether or not university libraries are empty, since a full library may well be of little real relevance to the pressing problems and specificities of the continent in terms of perspectives and contents. Education for Africans has, in the main, tended to be an exercise in self-evacuation and the devaluation of all the wisdom and cultural creativity of precolonial generations. The fact that Africans have placed and continue to place a very high premium on getting educated in the West has only compounded the problem.
In South Africa for example, despite the presence of numerous local universities and a relatively long history of university education, a Ph.D. from Britain is still valued more highly than a degree obtained locally. Like other Africans, South Africans instinctively ask one another or others: "Where did you do your degree?" and depending on the university you name, you could be treated as a superior, an equal, or an inferior by a fellow academic. If the Ph.D. holder is credited with the capacity to devalue those without a Ph.D. ("pull him down" syndrome), Ph.D. holders who graduate from Western universities are considered to be less "phenomenally dumb" than those from local universities. Some Africans would rather graduate from Oxford, Harvard, or the Sorbonne, for example, even if this means changing their specializations to accommodate the limited academic menu offered in these heavyweight Western universities. Africans continue to flood Europe and North America to research aspects of their own countries-which normally are best studied back home in Africa-mostly for the prestige and status that studying abroad brings. Parents continue to send their children to the West for education with the conviction that a degree even from a commercialized and second-rate Western university brings more opportunities than one from a top university in Africa.
And in regard to migration to study in the West, the U.K., France, Germany, and the U.S. in particular were treated to the feast of their lives by African governments and parents in the 1970s and early 1980s, when African economies were not yet as entangled in SAP and debts as they are today. These studies cost millions, and there is no gainsaying that many universities in the West have benefited a great deal financially, and even academically, from the influx of students from Africa and elsewhere in the developing world. As these universities feel the pinch of increased rationalization, they have become more aggressive and commercialized in their bid to recruit students from Africa. "In the United States, the 458,000 international students contributed more than $7 billion to the economy in 1997" alone (Ramphele 1999:10) . The imperatives to make money and stay in business seem increasingly to undermine the need for quality education and graduates they can be proud of. McDonaldized degrees have become the order of the day, and African students among the best drive-through customers. The logic: It doesn't really matter whether or not you deserve a degree, or what you do with it, as long as you've paid for it and cleared yourself out of the queue for other hungry customers to be served.
Until the late 1980s, many governments sent hundreds of students abroad each year for training in computer sciences and artificial intelligence, engineering technologies, nuclear physics, and so on. The exercise was very cosdy and the competition for selection keen and often corrupt. But what happened when these students graduated? There were no jobs for them in their home countries, because states lacked the necessary infrastructures to absorb them and make use of their expertise. The only option available to most of them was to seek integration into state bureaucracy and the civil service, where they would be paid for doing little of relevance, or simply for rendering a very uncivil service to their compatriots.
Graduates who could not stand this sort of hand-to-mouth existence under the overpowering spell of repressive regimes sought alternative employment in the West, especially in the U.S., Britain, and France. Thus the very Western countries that charged African states exorbitant rates to train their students now benefited from the expertise of these young African intellectuals almost free of charge. Once employed to work for this or that Western firm or corporate interest, all their contributions to the sciences, all their inventions in modern technology, were copyrighted by the firms in question, and the glory that would have been African was now Western. This was true of other developing countries, which have lost out to the West because of brain drain. It has yet to occur to African governments to demand compensation from Western countries employing their intelligentsia, just as it never occurred to them to think twice before financing the training of these students in areas (artificial intelligence, nuclear physics, etc.) the utility and urgency of which were not too obvious to their home countries. This brings to mind the story of a young Nigerian sponsored to study abroad in the U.K. by his village community, but whom the very village disowned when he returned as a qualified veterinarian to an expectant community where people were dying for lack of basic medical care.
Today only countries with vibrant economies such as Botswana and South Africa can still afford to send students abroad en masse for higher education, unassisted by donors. The rest have given up on this expensive venture, from which the West benefited enormously while it lasted. Of course, with the end of apartheid in South Africa and with the appreciation of the hard currencies of the West in relation to the soft currencies of Africa, some elites from Africa north of the Limpopo now target the historically privileged white universities (Witwatersrand, Cape Town, Rhodes, Natal, Rand Afrikaans, Stellenbosch, etc.) of South Africa as the closest substitute to the Europe and North America they have lost out on (see Hugo 1998b) . In 1996, more than 13,606 international students were studying at South African universities and technikons, with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) alone accounting for 50 percent of this, and Europe for about a quarter (Ramphele 1999:1-5) . And in many ways, being educated in South African universities is little different from being educated in the West, which remains a constant point of reference in the quest for excellence in die (not so) new South Africa (see Mamdani 1993:13-15) , as academia has not yet transformed itself significantly from its apartheid heritage (see Hugo 1998b), a point well illustrated by exchanges between Mahmood Mamdani and others in the curriculum debate on the teaching of Africa at the University of Cape Town (see Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town 1998; Hall 1998). For one thing, rhetoric aside, few South African elites (whites and blacks) consider themselves part of Africa socially, economically, and culturally. They are much "too civilized" to be lumped together with the rest, and so is their university system, including even the historically black and impoverished universities. In this regard, South Africa is the West next door, thanks to the ideology of apartheid and the pedagogy of subjection.
If African governments can afford to pay so much to have their students trained in the West (or Western-type local institutions) in areas not always relevant to their immediate needs and problems, these governments should also be able to obtain the best deal possible from any Western state desirous of harnessing the talents of un-and underemployed African experts. Otherwise, there is hardly any way Western education or training could ever facilitate the movement of Africa away from exogenously induced poverty and exploitation.
Epistemological Considerations
The extraverted nature of African education in general and university education in particular has favored the Western knowledge industry tremen-dously. It has allowed Western intellectual traditions and practitioners to write themselves into the past, present, and future of Africa as civilizers, saviors, initiators, mentors, arbiters (Fonlon 1967; Chinweizu 1987; Mudimbe 1988; Ngugi wa Thiong'o 1977; Comaroff & Comaroff 1997; Crossman & Devisch 1999; Mbembe 2000:7-40; 2001:1-23) . Europe and North America have for decades dominated the rest of the world with their academic products. Focusing on the social sciences, Frederick Gareau, an American sociologist of knowledge, has noted that the West has been consistently more advanced and expansionist than the underdeveloped and dependent regions of the world. In the late 1980s, he remarked that American social science, in its "unrelenting one-way traffic," was able to penetrate countries with cultures as different from its own as France, Canada, India, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (1987:599) . The African continent should be included in his list. This penetration has given American social science a "privileged position" with "a very favourable export balance of communications," a condition of "talking without listening." Not only is there little importation, but American social scientists also ensure that "incoming messages are in accord with American socio-cultural norms." This, Gareau observes, "betrays an ethnocentric, inward-looking fixation," with little preference for anything foreign: "if foreign, a preference for the Anglo-Saxon world; little concern for Continental Europe, and indifference or hostility towards the Second and the Third Worlds" (1987:598-99) . Focusing on the discipline of international relations, and writing ten years later, Kim Richard Nossal makes exactly the same observations. Nossal notes that textbooks in this area "portray the world to their readers from a uniquely American point of view: they are reviewed by Americans; the sources they cite are American; the examples are American; the theory is American; the experience is American; the focus is American; and i n . . . [some cases], the voice is also explicitly American" (1998:12) . This makes it extremely difficult for thinking that is critical of American assumptions or (mis) representations of the rest of the world to find its way into mainstream American academic circles or in other circles for that matter, given America's impressive academic export record. In this connection, perspectives sympathetic to the predicaments of Africa have suffered a great rejection rate by university curricula, reviewers for publishers, and academic peers who stick to their conceptual and methodological spots however compelling arguments to the contrary have been.
Understood in terms of the center-periphery perspective, the favorable "export balance" for American social science can be explained by the spread of American political, economic, and cultural values after World War II. Following the war, America, as a superpower, exported its cultural values through educational aid and the social sciences. "The U.S. exported its social science sects abroad both by training social scientists in the homeland and by sending experts abroad. The expense incurred was often borne by the United States government or by private foundations" (Gareau 1987:602) . In this way, America has been able, over the years, to use its doctrine of "free flow of information" as a "highly effective ideological club" to promote its political, economic, and cultural values by whipping "alternative forms of social organization" into a ridiculous defensiveness (Schiller 1977) . In Africa it has managed to dwarf the cultural legacies of former colonial masters from Europe, including in higher education where American nomenclature and maniere de /aire have gained prominence (see Mazrui 1986:247-48) . The advent of the Internet and its purported equalizing potential for the developing world does not seem to be achieving much in redefining unequal flows of information and cultural products between the West (epitomized by America) and Africa, the Internet's significant impact notwithstanding (see Nyamnjoh 1999; Olorunnisola 2000) .
Such dependence in Africa is compounded by the fact that the production of social-scientific knowledge requires huge funds for university infrastructures, from lecture halls to libraries, computers, laboratory equipment, and research facilities, which not even the best scholars and institutions in the continent can easily afford. In terms of infrastructure and finance, well-endowed institutions like the University of Botswana and the historically white universities of South Africa are rare exceptions. What this means in practice is that most of the time African scholars are forced to consume not books and research output of their own production or choice, but what their affluent and better-placed counterparts in North America and Europe choose to share with them at the peripheries. Cooperation takes the form of Western universities' calling the tune for the African pipers they have paid. Collaborative research has often worked in the interest of the Western partners, who, armed with theoretical sophistication and a fat wallet, have usually reduced their African collaborators to data collectors and research assistants. And this concerns even the field of African studies, where Western Africanists appear as gate-keepers and Africans as gate-crashers (see Mkandawire 1997; Berger 1997; Prah 1998) . Because the leading journals and publishers are based in the West and controlled by Western academics, African debates and perspectives find it very difficult to get fair and adequate representation. When manuscripts by Africans are not simply dismissed for being "uninformed by current debates and related literature," they may be turned down for challenging conventional wisdom and traditional assumptions about the continent (see Cabral et al.1998; Mkandawire 1997 ). The few African academics who succeed in penetrating such gate-keeping mechanisms have done so often by making serious sacrifices in terms of the perspectives, methodologies, and contextual relevance of their publications and scholarship (see Prah 1998:27-31) .
Migrating to the West often does not help, and could indeed exacerbate the problem. It has been observed that the most prominent voices in African studies today are "diasporic intellectuals" whose "inspiration comes perhaps more from nicely subtle readings of fashionable European theo-rists... than it does from... current local knowledge of the cultural politics of everyday life in the postcolonial hinterlands" (Werbner 1996:6) . Little wonder that the study of Africa continues to be dominated by perspectives that privilege analogy over the historical processes that should qualify Africa as a unit of analysis in its own right (Mamdani 1996:12-13) . As Mbembe observes, there is hardly ever a discourse on Africa for Africa's sake, and the West has often used Africa as a pretext for its own subjectivities, its self-imagination and its perversions. And no amount of new knowledge seems challenge enough to bury for good the ghost of simplistic assumptions about Africa (Mbembe 2000:10-21; 2001:3-9) . In this sense, a Western epistemological export that marries science and ideology in subtle ways for hegemonic purposes has dominated social science in and on Africa, and colored perceptions of Africa even by Africans. This dominant epistemological export has not always been sensitive to new perspectives that question conventional wisdom and myopic assumptions. It has stayed largely faithful to a type of social science induced and informed more by fantasies, prejudices, stereotypes, assumptions, ideologies, or biases about Africa and Africans (see Nyamnjoh 2001) . Given its remarkable ability to reproduce and market itself globally, this epistemological export has emptied academia of the power and impact of competing systems of knowledge by Africans (see Mudimbe 1988:x-xi) . Mudimbe notes that "Even in the most explicitly 'Afrocentric' descriptions, models of analysis explicitly or implicitly, knowingly or unknowingly, refer... [to] categories and conceptual systems which depend on a Western epistemological order" as if "African Weltanschauungen and African traditional systems of thought are unthinkable and cannot be made explicit within the framework of their own rationality... [or] epistemological locus" (Mudimbe 1988:x) .
Under the dominant epistemological import from the West, most accounts of African cultures and experiences have been generated from the insensitive position of power and quest for convergence and homogeneity. Explicit or implicit in these accounts is the assumption that African societies should reproduce Western ideals and institutions regardless of feasibility or contextual differences. Few researchers of Africa, even in African universities, have questioned adequately the theories, concepts, and basic assumptions informed by the dominant epistemological import. The tendency has been to conform to a world conceived in the image of the West without the "Rest" (Chinweizu 1987; Mafeje 1998:26-29) . Often missing have been perspectives of the silent majorities deprived of the opportunity to tell their own story their own way or even to enrich defective accounts by others of their own life experiences. Correcting this entails paying more attention to the popular epistemology from which ordinary people draw on a daily basis, and the ways they situate themselves in relationship to others within that epistemology (see Nyamnjoh 2001) .
The Western epistemological import has survived in the continent more because it suits the purposes of the agents of Westernization than because of its relevance to understanding the African situation. Those who run university programs along the Western models are seldom tolerant of challenge, stimulation, provocation, and competing perspectives. They protect their intellectual spots jealously, and are ready to deflate all "saboteurs" and "subversives." They want their programs to go on without disturbance, and select as lecturers or accept and sponsor only those research questions and findings that confirm their basic assumptions about scholarship and the African condition. But the African university, academic, and researcher have the responsibility to challenge such unfounded assumptions based on vested interests and hidden agendas. This is by no means an easy task, especially since scholars in Africa rely on these very agents of cultural devaluation of Africa to fund and disseminate their research. It is a truism that few in a position of power and control will accept research that is critical of them, especially in a context in which relations of unequal exchange with the outside world have already diminished that power and control considerably. They are more likely, therefore, to sponsor research that will produce results that justify their position or help them in their defense when challenged. To paraphrase Susan George, it matters little how many "mistakes" mainstream researchers or theorists make or how insensitive to the predicaments of ordinary people they are, for "protected and nurtured by those whose political objectives they support, package and condone, they have a licence to go on making them, whatever the consequences." Through the university institutions they create and fund, the powerful are able to perpetuate their ideologies by ensuring that only people with the "correct" ideas are recruited or retained to work there (George 1992:109,168-71) . Neoliberals and their institutions of legitimation, for example, know only too well that in order to penetrate people's heads and acquire their hearts, hands, and destinies, they have to make their ideas part of the daily life of people and society, by packaging, conveying, and propagating these ideas through books, magazines, journals, conferences, symposia, professional associations, student organizations, university chairs, mass media, and other means (see George 1997) .
Implications for Studying Africa
The study of Africa, it has been argued, belongs to the modern university "precisely because research in Africa has shaped the disciplines and thereby shaped our convictions as to what may universally be true" . Use of the pronoun our may give the mistaken impression that an all-inclusive approach was used in elaborating this discourse. Rather, what obtained was nothing short of an epistemological imperialism that has facilitated both a Western intellectual hegemony and the silencing of Africans even in the study of Africa (see Copans 1990:305-95; Obenga 2001) . Failure of African scholars to follow or to excel in Western research protocols explains this to a certain extent. But a complete explanation must also acknowledge persistent questions or doubts about the objectivity of Africans, similar to those that caused some African Americans to be prevented from studying Africa in prestigious U.S. universities (e.g., Boston, Northwestern, UCLA, and Wisconsin). 4 Admittedly, the African Studies Association passed a resolution in 1970 to take specific steps to promote greater interest in African studies among African Americans. However, the long-term impact of earlier policies has yet to yield to new attitudes. Africa's marginality under the current wave of globalization has only compounded the continent's peripheral role in scholarly production. Voices calling for a reversal of this pattern have been raised even in the center. Notable among them is Gwendolyn Mikell, who in her 1997 ASA presidential address, "Forging Mutuality," called for the altering of operations so that Africa, too, becomes a partner in African studies (1999:6). The tortoise may want to fly. But there are constraints to overcome before Africans escape their discursive neutralization. Commitment to the need to reconfigure such "global intellectual hegemony" (Gosovic 2000:449) and its negative impact on Africa was a determining factor when the editors of the African Studies Review invited us to edit this special issue on universities in Africa.
Intellectual hegemony engenders "intellectual totalitarianism" and "intellectual dependency" for those without the power or capacity to resist (Gosovic 2000:448) . Only by casting off this dependency will Africans, in another register, cease to be just guests at the dining table or beggars scavenging for crumbs, by entering the kitchen to help determine the menu and prepare the meal. A growing number of Africans are no longer satisfied with discourses that support inquiries into already existing possibilities. But rather than opt for autarky, they want to enter into cooperation, collaboration, and a conversation that deals with the working out of novel possibilities with their Western counterparts and diasporic brethren (Shotter 1993:70) . Discourses by the "Other" have had disturbing implications for Africa, and the need for a popular epistemology informed by the reality of ordinary Africans imposes itself (see Nyamnjoh 2001 ).
Yet we can begin to get there only if research by Africans critical of conventional wisdom in academia is greeted with recognition rather than censorship, caricature, or derision (see Obenga 2001:49-66) . Only by creating space for African scholarship based on Africa as a unit of analysis in its own right can we begin to correct prevalent situations whereby much is known of what African states, societies, and economies are not (thanks to dogmatic and normative assumptions of mainstream scholarship) but very little of what they actually are (Mbembe 2000:21; 2001:9) . Accepting the research agendas of African scholars may be not just "a matter of ecumenism or goodwill," but also the beginnings of a conversation that could enrich scholarship in the West and elsewhere (Appadurai 1999:235-37) . Only the forging of this mutuality will help re-energize African scholars and allow for a building of a genuinely international and democratic community of researchers. In this regard, Arjun Appadurai sees a future of profound internationalization that invites academics across the globe to a conversation about research wherein "the very elements of the ethic could be subjects of debate, and to which scholars from other societies and traditions of inquiry could bring their own ideas about what counts as new knowledge and about what communities of judgement and accountability they might judge to be central in the pursuit of such knowledge" (Appadurai 1999:237) .
Global conversations and cooperation among universities and scholars are a good starting point in a long journey of equalization and recognition for marginalized epistemologies. But any global restructuring of power relations in scholarship can begin to be meaningful to ordinary Africans only through universities and curricula that are in tune with their predicaments. In this connection, academics and researchers from and on Africa cannot afford to be blind to the plight of African scholarship whatever the pressures they may face, and regardless of their own levels of misery and need for sustenance. Over two decades ago Fonlon (1978) made a plea for the African university as a place for genuine intellectuals dedicated to the common weal. Thus, for African universities and researchers to contribute toward a genuine, multifaceted liberation of the continent and its peoples, they ought to start not byjoining the bandwagon as has been their history, but with a careful rethinking of African concerns and priorities, and by coming up with educational policies sympathetic to the needs of ordinary Africans (see Copans 1990 Copans , 1993 . Mamdani (1993:19) refers to rooting African universities in African soil, and Mafeje calls for a move away from "received theory or contrived universalism" to an "intimate knowledge of the dynamics of African culture [s] in a contemporary setting " (1988:8) . There is need for an insightful scrutiny of current curricula-their origin, form, content, assumptions, and practicability-followed by the decision whether to accept, reject, or modify. The future of higher education in Africa can be hopeful only through a meticulous and creative process of cultural restitution and indigenization, even as African scholars continue to cooperate and converse with intellectual bedfellows in the West and elsewhere. All initiatives in this regard must be encouraged, and Peter Crossman's and Rene Devisch's Endogenisation and African Universities survey (1999)-premised on the assumption that only through greater adaptation to local and national sociocultural contexts may African universities overcome some of the functional difficulties they currently face and make themselves more relevant to the needs of the countries and peoples they serve-could serve as a good starting point for those with research interest in this area. If Africa is to join a global conversation of universities and scholars, it is only appropriate that it does so on its own terms, with the interests and concerns of ordinary Africans as guiding principle.
